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Abstract 
This paper goes over three big crises with a global resonance which took place in the American 
economy during the 20th century. Namely, the Bank Panic of  1907, the Great Depression of  1929 
and the Savings and Loan Crisis of  the 1980s are examined. The paper lists the major events 
during the crises in question and probes the causes, consequences and ways through which each 
crisis was attempted to be encountered. Through this examination, useful lessons to be learned 
and fatal mistakes to be avoided arise. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Undoubtedly, every economic crisis brings about devastating consequences, sometimes to a lesser 
other times to a greater extent. However, history can prove to be a very good teacher for the 
future. Even though financial crises are phenomena not so frequent, they are phenomena 
recurrent just like business cycles. The examination of  the various crises, of  their causes, the 
circumstances under which they took place, the ways they were managed and dealt, as well as the 
extent to which these ways were effective has something to teach us and can avert us from 
making similar mistakes in the future. 
The American economy has always attracted scientific interest, as it is the largest national 
economy worldwide. The size and significance of  this economy mean that its economic course 
affects enormously the economic course of  many, if  not all, countries on a global basis. The 
economic conditions in the American economy determine the conditions that prevail or are 
going to prevail on the planet and this is why American economy’s observation and examination 
is of  so high importance. 
If  someone examines the US economy during the 20th century he will find out that it has gone 
through many and major economic crises. Among them are the Bank Panic of  1907, a significant 
economic downturn in 1921, the Bank Panic of  the 1930s, the Great Depression, the failure of  
the Bank of  Illinois in 1984, the Savings and Loan Debacle of  the 1980s and the Long Term 
Capital Management Crisis in 1998. 
This paper focuses on the Bank Panic of  1907, the crisis of  1929 and the Savings and Loan crisis 
of  the 1980s. The Bank Panic of  1907 was the first economic crisis of  the 20th century and 
proved to be a crucial moment for the financial history of  the USA causing many changes and 
reforms in the Federal Reserve System. According to many analysts’ opinion, it was the presage 
for the crash of  1929. The stock crash of  1929 and the Great Depression that followed it 
constitute maybe the most difficult period of  the 20th century for the US economy and other 
countries’ economies. The S&L crisis, finally, was the most important post-war crisis of  the US 
banking sector.  
The purpose of  this paper is to examine the three above-mentioned crises, to present the events 
that took place before, during and after them, their causes, their implications and the ways they 
were encountered. The aim of  the paper is to draw some useful conclusions about what each 
crisis can teach us and demonstrate actions to repeat and others to avoid. 
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In the second section of  the paper, a brief  review of  the literature over those crises is attempted. 
In the third, fourth and fifth section the Bank Panic of  1907, the crisis of  1929 and the crisis of  
the 1980s are examined respectively. In the sixth section the lessons that each crisis of  them has 
to teach us are clearly set forth. The paper finishes with summary and conclusions  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
All three under examination crises have been analyzed to a great degree in the global literature. A 
complete research overview could fill thousands of  pages and is beyond the scope of  this paper. 
However, a brief  overview of  the content of  some of  these papers will be attempted. 
The Bank Panic of  1907 
Joseph French Johnson (1908) recounts the events of  1907 and investigates the causes and the 
circumstances that rendered these events so unavoidable. He also seeks ways through which 
similar events in the future can be avoided. According to Johnson, the crisis of  1907 was mainly 
the result of  capital stock depletion due to wars, industrial and generally business demand and 
speculative actions. The panic was the product of  a combination of  factors, such as the weak 
lending capacity of  banks, the lack of  organization and unity among banks, the lack of  a deposit 
insurance system, the deficient control over reserve levels, the agriculture-oriented demand for 
cash and the investors’ rage because of  the various scandals that had taken place.  
According to Johnson, the solution to the crisis lied neither under the elimination if  the current 
system nor under the increase of  a country’s cash reserves. The solution was to be found in the 
creation of  a new banking system which would consist of  equal independent units. The bank 
panic revealed two major necessities for banks: a flexible currency and financial stability and 
solidarity. 
According to Edwin R. A. Seligman (1908), the possible interpretations with regard to the crisis 
of  1907 can be classified into two categories. The first category includes the superficial 
interpretations. Thus, it is often argued that the outbreak of  a crisis stems from the lack of  
confidence. Less important is the effort to associate a crisis with a specific government policy. 
Contrary to the widely superficial interpretations, the second category entails interpretations that 
search beneath the surface to reveal the root causes of  the crises. 
Ellis W. Tallman and Jon R. Moen (1990) examine the circumstances that led to the panic, as well 
as the intervention measures that were taken during the panic focusing on the operation of  trusts 
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as financial intermediaries. They find that the unequal regulation of  the various financial 
institutions led to the concentration of  risky assets to the less regulated trusts. The risky 
portfolios of  these trusts made them the center where the crisis started from and expanded later 
to the whole market. According to the two researchers, equal access of  all institutions to all assets 
and investment opportunities can mitigate the peril that a collapse of  a type of  asset will threaten 
the solvency of  a whole group of  financial intermediaries. 
Mauro Boianovsky (2011) in his paper reproduces and analyzes the opinion that was issued in 
Sweden in 1908 by Knut Wicksell. According to this opinion, the crisis of  1907 in the US 
economy was a moral one and was caused by a set of  evidence received by the American people 
who showed that the leading financial advisors who control the banks, the industries and the 
trusts are often reckless and rarely honest. This fact alarmed depositors and caused the general 
collapse of  the US financial system. 
Ellis W. Tallman (2012) summarizes the views about the crisis of  1907 that dominate in the 
global literature. In his paper he points to the key factors that contributed to the financial crisis, 
he examines the influence of  the crisis over subsequent legislation and puts the crisis of  1907 
into a historical framework associated with the size of  the related business cycle. Moreover, 
Tallman compares the crisis of  1907 to the recent crisis of  2008. He finds that the main similarity 
between the two crises is that they both were caused by financial intermediaries in New York 
which were considered to be indirectly connected to the payments system –trusts in 1907, 
investment banks in 2008. In addition, these intermediaries had no direct access to relative 
sources of  liquidity – the Clearing House in 1907, the Federal Reserve Bank in 2008. 
The Great Depression of  1929 
Stephen G. Cecchetti (1997) argues that the Fed played an important role in every unsuccessful 
policy of  that period and, thus, the lessons that we gain from the crisis have to do with the 
operation of  the Central Bank and the financial system. According to Cecchetti, the Great 
Depression was not caused by the stock crash of  1929. He also argues that there are several clues 
that lead to three unambiguous conclusions. First, the collapse of  the financial system could have 
been avoided if  the Fed had properly understood its role as a lender of  last resort. Second, 
deflation played a major role in deepening the recession. Third, the gold standard as a system of  
supporting a fixed exchange rate system proved to be disastrous. 
Christina Romer (1988) argues that the collapse of  stock prices in October 1929 brought about 
temporary uncertainty about the future income and resulted in reduced demand for consumer 
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durables. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that there appears to be a significant negative 
correlation between the stock market volatility and the production of  consumer durables in the 
prewar period. While economists separate the events of  the Great Crash and the Great 
Depression, according to Romer it is likely that a significant relationship between the stock 
market crash and the acceleration of  decline in real GDP between 1929 and 1930 exists. 
Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott (2001) are opposed to the economists’ common 
view that the stock prices of  the listed on the New York Stock Exchange companies, which fell 
by 30% in the autumn of  1929, were overvalued and that the stock market was in need of  a 
correction. On the contrary, McGrattan and Prescott agree with the view of  Irving Fisher, who 
argued and tried to prove that the market was actually undervalued. The two economists in their 
paper calculate the fundamental values of  common shares in 1929 and compare them to the 
actual price estimates. They find that the stock market in 1929 did not collapse due to the fact 
that it was overvalued. The empirical data, in fact, provide strong support that common stocks 
were undervalued even at their peak in 1929. 
According to Charles P. Kindleberger (1973) the depression of  1929 was so broad, so deep and 
so long-lasting for two major reasons. First, the global economic system had become unstable 
because the British did not have the ability and second because the Americans did not have the 
will to stabilize it. The shocks to the system caused by the overproduction of  certain goods, such 
as wheat, by the decline of  interest rates in 1927, by the halt of  lending to Germany in 1928 or 
by the crash of  1929 were not so great. Similar shocks had been encountered in the past with 
success. The global economic system was unstable and a country should intervene and stabilize it. 
In 1929 the British were unable and the Americans were unwilling to do this. When every 
country turned to protect its own investments, the global public interest collapsed and so did the 
individual interests. 
Lawrence W. Reed (1998) opposes to the opinion of  many researchers who argue that free-
market capitalism is to blame for the Great Depression of  1929 and promotes government 
intervention as a solution to the economic problems of  the period. Reed debunks this common 
perception and highlights the central role that flimsy government policy played in raising the 
catastrophic crisis. Generally, he tries to prove that many truths of  his time were myths after all. 
The greatest myth among them was that capitalism and free-market economy were responsible 
for the Great Depression and that only government intervention brought about recovery in the 
US economy. 
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The Savings and Loan Crisis of  the 1980s 
According to Robert J. Laughlin (1991), the S&L Debacle, which was the result of  many factors 
and forces, could have been avoided if  timely action had been taken. The structure of  the S&L 
industry was defective due to its sensitivity to the interest rate risk. Non-diversified portfolios of  
long-term fixed rate securities were financed by short-term liabilities and this proved to be a 
disastrous combination. Congress increased the levels of  deposit insurance and allocated these 
deposits to entities without first controlling effectively for their operations. In the meanwhile, the 
Federal Mortgage Bank of  Boston reduced its capital requirements level allowing troubled 
institutions to increase their exposure to risk and losses. Generally, according to Laughlin, the 
S&L Debacle was caused by internal to the industry structural problems, imprudent movements 
of  the Congress and various regulatory faults. 
John H. Boyd and Mark Gertler (1994) in their paper argue that large banking institutions were 
the main culprits for the unusually poor performance of  the entire industry. These institutions 
contributed, according to their data, by significantly disproportionate way to the total loan losses. 
Two were the factors that let this take place. First, deregulation and financial innovation that led 
to an increase in the competition within the banking sector and second, the regulatory 
environment that used to subsidize risk-taking by the larger rather than the smaller banks. Under 
the “too-big-to-fail” assumption, large banks benefited from multiple actions that isolated them 
from the influence of  their loan losses. The main view of  Boyd and Gertler is that the “too-big-
to-fail” assumption was a key factor behind the crisis and they support this view with panel data. 
Garrett J. Hardin and Edmond G. Miranne (1997) apply the theory of  the tragedy of  the 
commons to the S&L debacle and show that the privatization of  profits and the externalization 
of  losses destroyed a whole thriving sector of  the American economy. The view they support is 
that there is a group of  problems that are not amenable to a technical solution and the S&L crisis 
is a very good example of  such a problem. By technical solution they mean the solution that 
presupposes a change in the methods used and requires little or no change in human values of  
virtue and morality. Thus, Hardin and Miranne consider that the main cause of  the S&L crisis 
was the implementation by government of  technical solutions which were doomed to fail. 
Lawrence J. White (2004) argues that the S&L debacle was a costly but rather decisive for the US 
deposit regulation event. The causes of  the crisis lie, according to him, in the restrictive 
government policy which finally put institutions into financial difficulties in accepting deposits 
and granting loans in the late 1970s and late 1980s. The Congress and at least three presidential 
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governments delayed too much the withdrawal of  the restrictions. When eventually the 
restrictions eased in 1980 and 1982, the regulations related to safety and prosperity eased as well 
exactly the time when they ought to be strengthened. The crisis was the natural aftermath with a 
final cost amounting to $160 million.  
Catherine England (1992) in her paper tries to summarize the lessons that the S&L crisis can 
teach us. According to her, the three most important lessons we obtain are as follows: first, 
excessive regulation was the primary cause of  the problems, second, the federal deposit insurance 
was ultimately responsible for the high costs of  the crisis and third, governmental efforts to 
protect the industry triggered only abuse and increase in the reorganization costs. 
 3. THE BANK PANIC OF 19071 
The Bank Panic of  1907 was the last and most intense of  the panics of  the so called National 
Banking Era in the USA. Bank panics are characterized by a massive withdrawal of  deposits, i.e. 
the attempt of  the majority of  the depositors to withdraw from the banking system their capitals. 
Because banks do not keep their whole available cash in form of  reserves, they face great 
difficulty to work with such a situation. What made this bank panic different from the others was 
that it focused on the American trusts and that there was absence of  a central banking entity. 
A crisis is a concept different from a panic (Johnson, 1908). A crisis refers to the turning point 
within a period of  prosperity, it is always followed by a period of  liquidation during which 
employment shrinks and the prices of  goods and securities decline. A panic refers to a temporary 
paralysis of  a country’s credit system and can be caused by conditions that undermine the 
credibility on which credit relies. In this case, the crisis took place on January 1907, while the 
panic on October of  the same year. The crisis was a universal event, experienced by all countries 
that used the gold standard as a system, while the panic was a local event which was confined to 
the USA. 
On 16 October 1907 F. Augustus Heinze, who was the resident of  the National Commercial 
Bank of  New York used the resources of  the bank in an attempt to seize control of  the copper 
market by John Rockefeller, monopolizing the stock of  United Copper Company. Rockefeller, 
however, prevented his efforts by increasing the amount of  copper in the market, so the price of  
copper fell drifting its shares as well. 
                                                          
1  The report of  the events is based on the analysis of  Cahil (1998), the Federal Reserve Bank of  Boston (1993) 
and Tallman & Wicker (2009). 
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When the depositors of  the National Commercial Bank learned about the plans and intensions 
of  Heinze, they rushed to liquidate their deposits. The bank unable to cope with its financial 
obligations asked for help from the Clearing House2 , help that was provided to it only after 
Heinze and all his staff  had agreed to resign from their positions and duties. If  Heinze had been 
a mere speculator in copper market, financial markets might have absorbed the turmoil of  his 
failure. He was, nevertheless, deeply involved in banking and his overthrow had major 
consequences. In an attempt to learn the job, Heinze had established partnership with bankers 
and many institutions. 
The first banker that faced problems due to his relationship with Heinze was C. W. Morse, one of  
the heads of  the National Commercial Bank. During the reorganization of  the bank the Clearing 
House discovered that Morse was also the head of  six other banks, three of  which he 
administered with absolute autonomy. The officials of  the Clearing House were anxious, since 
Morse had used the shares of  a bank as collateral for loans which he took in order to buy shares 
of  the other banks. So if  a bank failed, the remaining six would have the same fate, as it finally 
happened when the press revealed Morse’s involvement in the National Commercial Bank. 
When the presence of  Heinze and Morse threatened to extinguish the credibility to the banks of  
New York, the Committee of  the Clearing House pressured them to resign, what was finally 
done, and established an audit team in order to determine to what extent the National 
Commercial Bank and other troubled banks were trustworthy and rightful to receive assistance 
from the House. Finally, the Committee decided to support the National Commercial Bank so 
that it could meet the demands of  its depositors. That is, member banks of  the House would 
contribute funds in an attempt to help the National Commercial Bank cover the massive 
withdrawals that it encountered.  
However, the situation did not improve. On 18 October the depositors of  Knickerbocker Trust 
Company began to withdraw their deposits when they were informed that the company’s 
president, Charles T. Barney, was a business partner of  Heinze and Morse. The situation got 
worse when the same day the Clearing House announced its unwillingness to help Knickerbocker. 
As a trust, Knickerbocker was not a member of  the Clearing House.  
                                                          
2   The Clearing House was an organization, the member banks of  which had agreed to exchange and edit each 
other’s checks. The Clearing House of  New York had also some other responsibilities, which are nowadays 
undertaken by the government.  
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On 21 October, while the situation got worse and worse, Barney resigned from president of  
Knickerbocker. The next day the trust’s depositors were so desperate to withdraw their money 
that the institution gave $8 million into three hours and was forced to close. 
In an attempt to prevent the collapse of  the stock market, J. P. Morgan and other leading banks 
liquidated a part of  their assets in order to replenish the accounts of  the trusts, but these funds 
proved to be inadequate and unable to halt the panic. The secretary of  the Treasury, George B. 
Corteglou, provided an additional sum of  $25 million to prevent the collapse of  trusts. 
Initially, the measures ceased the public anxiety. Nonetheless, the media coverage of  the 
difficulties of  the banks of  New York and the failure of  many banks in other regions led to the 
spread of  panic across the country. This gave rise to a chain reaction and banks requested from 
the Banks of  New York to provide them with their reserves3. By the end of  October, the banks 
of  New York had granted the requested reserves depleting the funds that had been gathered in 
order to help them and bringing again the problems to the fore. 
The greatest difficulty that arouse from the bank panic was the lack of  money. In order to limit 
the deposit withdrawals the governments of  Nevada, California, Oklahoma, Washington and 
Oregon suppressed banking operations and declared bank holidays. 
The substitution of  money with loan certificates of  the Clearing House was another way used to 
deal with the situation. Under regular circumstances, these certificates were mere loans between 
the bank members and their Clearing House. During crisis periods, however, banks in order to 
provide a medium of  transaction, often issued such certificates directly to depositors. Those 
certificates and other money substitutes as well were the main mediums of  transaction for more 
than two months. 
After the first issue of  certificates, loans increased by almost $10 million (Tallman & Moen, 
1990). Some researchers, such as Sprague (1908), argued that if  this issue had taken place earlier 
markets would have calmed down, the help would have been directed promptly to the insolvent 
banks and trusts, fewer banks would have bankrupt reducing the tension in financial markets and 
generally much suffering would have probably been avoided. 
The bank panic of  1907 damaged the economy in various ways. In the first place, it reduced the 
economic growth and undermined the overall credibility of  the economy (Cahill, 1998). Real 
GDP fell by 12% between the second quarter of  1907 and the first quarter of  1908. Interest rate 
                                                          
3 The banks of  New York kept  the reserves of  most banks 
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spreads increased by more than 20% on October 1907 and remained over 10% for the rest of  the 
year (Tallman & Wicker, 2009). 
Shortage of  liquidity forced banks to temporarily postpone their loan services. Moreover, the 
substitution of  money with certificates of  the Clearing house pushed domestic transactions aside. 
The interest rates of  these certificates varied, preventing banks and firms from accepting 
certificates from individuals and organizations outside their own geographical area (Cahill, 1998). 
Liquidity and cash shortage deprived entrepreneurs from resources necessary for salary payments 
and many firms shut down or reduced their working hours.  
According to Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter (2011), two were the main problems that 
were revealed during the bank panic of  1907. First, private clearing houses also faced default risk. 
Second, some firms, particularly the trusts of  New York, were not allowed to be members of  the 
Clearing House due to the intense competition between trusts and commercial banks and this 
fact made the situation worse. 
The panic of  1907 disrupted financial markets to such a degree that the establishment of  the Fed 
and the formation of  the US banking system to its current form became indispensable (Tallman 
& Moen, 1990). Thus, in 1913 the Federal Banking Act was issued. This Act was designed to 
regulate the national quantity of  money, the money supply and credit by means of  buying and 
selling government bonds and issuing treasury bills (Cahill, 1998). Paralyzing the financial 
network of  the country and inducing a severe recession, the panic revealed the weakness and the 
need for reformation of  the national financial system. 
Undoubtedly, the sources of  turmoil in the US economy in 1907 were the trusts of  New York, 
which were not central to the payments system (Tallman & Wicker, 2009). The national banks of  
New York, particularly the large ones, on the other hand, stood to the center of  the payments 
system and this discrepancy increased the tension between trusts and banks. Trusts chose not to 
be members of  the Clearing House of  the USA even though they were given this opportunity 
because they felt that the benefits of  this integration would be lower than the respective costs. 
Thus, trusts stayed outside the Clearing House and its regulatory framework. When the panic of  
1907 took place, trusts had no access to the liquidity of  the House and this led to the 
deterioration of  their situation. The refusal of  the Clearing House to provide Knickerbocker with 
assistance led to its economic failure and to the creation of  chain reactions.  
The main cause of  the bank panic was the instability of  the financial system which allowed for 
disputable financial practices by devious entrepreneurs (Tallman & Wicker, 2011). The panic 
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involved various types of  financial intermediaries, each of  which was distinct and played a unique 
role the same time when every type operated under a different set of  regulations (Tallman & 
Moen, 1990). This regulatory framework created conditions that rendered the scenario of  panic 
more probable than it would have been if  legislation provided a uniform regulation and allowed 
for an equal access to all investment opportunities for all.  
Some researchers, Sprague (1910), Kemmeren (1910) and Laughlin (1912) among them, 
attributed the crisis of  1907 to the rigidity of  the structure of  the US national banking system. 
This is not surprising nowadays since the system then lacked a central banking institution which 
could quickly adjust the monetary base through the purchase and selling of  short-term 
marketable assets. This means that the system did not provide a reliable institution which could 
manage the overall provision of  liquidity. 
As a result, total liquidity provision was imminent to shocks which were exogenous to the 
domestic monetary system. Furthermore, the system lacked a distinct lender of  last resort to 
which a bank could turn for emergency loans if  it had to deal with massive deposit withdrawals. 
The Clearing House of  New York tried to play this role, but it typically failed (Tallman, 2012).  
4. THE STOCK MARKET CRASH AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF 1929 
The economic contraction between 1929 and 1933 was unarguably, at least till the recent 
economic crisis, the most severe contraction of  business cycle that has been recorded in the US 
history. Although the crisis originated from the USA, it led to a major reduction in output and 
employment and to an intense deflation almost in every country in the world (Romer, 2003). The 
stock crash of  1929 was followed by a deep recession for the American, and not only, economy, 
although the association between the crash and the crisis is questionable among economic 
researchers. Sylla (2004) in one of  his papers supported the lack of  connection between the two 
events. Dornbush and Fisher (1984) also argued that the Great Crash of  1929 cannot have 
caused the Great Depression, since the decrease in output started before the collapse of  the 
stock market and since the larger declines of  production happened almost two years after the 
bank panics of  1931. 
The course of  the stock market during the period under consideration is depicted in Figure 1 
below:  
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Figure 1: The course of  Dow Jones Industrial Average Index for the period 1929-1933 
Source: finance.yahoo.com 
The Index reached a peak of  381 on 3 September and closed at 351 on 15 October, displaying a 
slight decrease. The month that followed was disastrous. From an intraday high of  330 on 23 
October 1929, the index fell the next day (Black Thursday) at a low of  272, while at the same 
time there was a record volume of  12.9 million shares. The next two days the prices stabilized at 
the level of  299. On Monday 28 October, however, which remained known as Black Monday, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Index closed at 261 while the next day (Black Tuesday) it fell more reaching 
at 212 and noted a new record volume of  16.9 million shares. These two days when the Index 
lost 23% of  its value compared to the closing price of  Saturday, are regarded as the focal point 
of  the Great Stock Crash (Sylla, 2004). The decline in Wall Street continued thereafter and on 13 
October the index closed at 199, reflecting a fall by 48% within a period of  two months. 
After the Great Stock Crash, the Great Depression arose. It started in the summer of  1929 and 
lasted, with varying intensity, ten years (Galbraith, 2000). The main severity of  the depression can 
be dated within the period 1929-1933. Real output and the general price level fell significantly 
during this period. The US industrial production fell by 47%, while real GDP fell by 30%. The 
General Price Level Index also decreased by 33%, while the unemployment rate exceeded 20%. 
Between 1930 and 1940 only once, in 1937, the average number of  unemployed fell below 8 
million. In 1933 almost one in four of  the labor force was workless, while in 1938 one in five was 
still unemployed (Galbraith, 2000). All these data are illustrated in the group of  Tables 1 on the 
Appendix.  
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During the period 1929-1933 production in factories and mines and public services fell by more 
than 50%. Real disposable income decreased by 28%. Stock prices amounted to the one tenth of  
their pre-crash value. The number of  unemployed Americans rose dramatically and discussions 
about revolt began to appear for the first time after the Civil War (Reed, 1998). Until 1939, 
employment and output remained at the levels of  1929 (Cole & Ohanian, 1999). 
The Great Crash and the Great Depression have not fully been elucidated. Economists have 
generated many theories for both events but consensus on the main forces behind them has not 
been achieved (Chari; Kehol & McGrattan, 2003). Widespread is the opinion that the shares of  
the US stock market were overvalued, they had created a “bubble” and the market needed to 
undergo a correction. However, there is also the contradictory opinion, which was expressed for 
the first by Irving Fisher on February 1930, according to which, the US shares were not 
overvalued, but undervalued before the Great Crash. This view was supported by subsequent 
studies such as that of  McGrattan and Prescott (2001). 
The most common explanation regarding the stock market crash of  1929 blames the practice of  
borrowing money in order to buy shares. Many historical texts contend that a frantic speculation 
on shares was fueled by excessive marginal borrowing (Reed, 1998). It has been often stressed 
that the collapse of  stock market in 1929 was inherent to the speculation which preceded it 
(Galbraith, 2000). The question seeking for answer was how long this speculation would last. It 
was expected that someday the confidence to the short-term increase in stock values would 
weaken. When this happened in 1929 many hustled to sell and this destroyed the reality of  rising 
values and a huge price drop incurred. 
Apart from the quarrel over whether the Great Depression is connected or not with the Great 
Crash, equally diverse are the views regarding the causes of  the Great Depression. According to 
Slivinski (2008), two were the dominant views of  what caused the crisis. According to the first 
view, between 1929 and 1933 there was a sudden decline in future expectations for economic 
growth which led to a collapse in demand for consumption and investment and could not be 
quickly corrected by the market. 
According to the second view, which stems from the neoclassical school of  thought, what the 
economy suffered from was not an internal weakness. Instead, it was influenced by the shocks of  
policy errors particularly those of  the Federal Reserve. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that 
the reduction by one third of  the national money supply between August 1929 and March 1933 
was disastrous for the economy and provided evidence of  the Central Bank’s inability. According 
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to the same economists, the death of  Benjamin Strong on October 1928 left the Fed without a 
capable leadership making its bad strategy even worse. Benjamin Strong was a major personality 
and had exerted great influence as a head of  the regional bank of  New York. 
It is commonly accepted that policy makers during the pre-crisis period made several faults (Sylla, 
2004). They increased taxes and tariffs on imports, they attempted to balance the budget by 
cutting down on government spending, they reduced money supply and let banks bankrupt 
massively causing the household and firm expenditure to fall. The level of  prices collapsed and 
unemployment climbed to unprecedented levels. 
Many economists believe that the US Central Bank allowed or caused the large drop in money 
supply partly in order to keep the gold standard (Romer, 2003). Under this standard, every 
country set a value for its currency in terms of  gold and got engaged in monetary policy actions 
in order to support this value. It is possible that if  the Central Bank had pursued an expansionary 
policy as a consequence of  the bank panic episodes that took place (in the last quarter of  1930, 
from March to June 1931, from August till the end of  the year and in the last quarter of  1932), 
foreigners would have lost their confidence to the commitment of  the USA to the gold standard.  
This would have led to large outflows of  gold reserves and the Americans would have to 
devaluate their currency. Furthermore, a speculative attack on the US dollar would have been 
feasible and the USA would have been forced to abandon the gold standard. The contribution of  
the gold standard to the causes of  the Great Depression is debatable, but the contribution of  the 
standard to the spread of  the crisis all over the world is undisputable. 
Around the world the main measures that were taken in order to mitigate the adverse effects of  
the crisis included currency devaluation and expansionary monetary policy. Currency devaluation, 
however, did not seem to have led to an immediate increase in output (Romer, 2003). 
Nevertheless, it allowed countries to expand their money supply without worrying about the 
changes in gold reserves and foreign exchange rates. Fiscal policy primary through tax increases 
played a much more trivial role to the economic recovery of  the USA, while this role varied from 
country to country. 
As far as the main consequences of  the Great Depression of  1929 are concerned, unarguably, the 
most important of  them deals with the misfortune and suffering of  people. During this period 
the standard of  living dropped dramatically and a big part of  the population lived or feared it was 
going to live hunger (Negreponti & Delivanis, 2010). Moreover, the Great Depression and the 
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way it was handled changed the global economy in many ways and above all meant the end of  the 
gold standard. 
From the Great Depression on, the trade unions and the social welfare state developed 
substantially. The US government introduced unemployment allowance and insurance for the 
elderly and other vulnerable population groups.  Moreover, in many countries after the Great 
Depression government regulation and supervision, particularly that of  financial markets, 
increased significantly. The Great Depression, finally, played an equally important role in shaping 
macroeconomic policies and policies aiming at restricting and controlling the upward and 
downward movements of  business cycles.  
5. THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS OF THE 1980s  
The Savings and Loan crisis has been described as the biggest set of  “white collar” crimes in the 
global history (Zimring & Hawkins, 1993). The situation that led to the crisis during the 1980s 
had started several decades earlier and, specifically, its origins trace back to the Great Depression 
of  1929 (Acharya et al, 2011). The state regulation for savings and loans was different from the 
state regulation for banks. The first was directed mainly by the objective of  government policy 
related to the encouragement of  the development of  private property (Moysich, 1997). 
The federally insured savings and loan system was established in the early 1930s in order to 
promote the construction of  new homes during the Great Depression and to protect the 
financial institutions from the kind of  destruction that followed the panic of  1929. The Federal 
Mortgage Banking Act of  1932 established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), 
whose purpose was to create a reserve system that would ensure the availability of  mortgage 
money to finance housing and to supervise savings and loans (Calavita; Tillman & Pontell, 1997). 
For several decades the supervision, control and regulation imposed by the FHLBB to the 
savings and loans was very slack partly because these institutions had a very narrowly defined 
financial role and little intension to extend it (Acharya et al, 2011). This situation changed during 
the 1970s, when interest rates rose sharply and the savings and loans began to seek for higher 
profits. 
Noteworthy is the fact that the regulation of  the savings and loans was sufficient to oversee them 
regarding their traditional operations. However, this regulation started to become weak and 
inadequate because of  the financial innovation that appeared and developed gradually during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Moysich, 1997). Financial innovation created new risky assets increased 
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the potential profit margins for banks and the competition between them. The new legislation 
that deregulated the banking industry in the early 1980s, the state Act of  1980 for the 
deregulation of  saving units and monetary control and the Government Act of  1982 about the 
savings and loans, provided these units with increased jurisdiction so that they could get involved 
in risky investment activities. The units, which up to this moment where restricted to the 
provision of  mortgage loans could now have 40% of  their assets on commercial real estate loans, 
30% on consumption loans and 10% on corporate loans. That is, they were allowed to have up to 
10% exposure to bonds and direct investments (Mishkin, 2004). 
The Congress encouraged diversification and explicitly allowed the savings and loans to engage in 
consumption and corporate loans. At the same time, government regulators continued to loosen 
the restrictions regarding the allocation of  savings and loans. They did so by loosening the 
regulations regarding safety and credibility, by lowering capital requirements and by changing the 
accounting rules in order to enable the units to correspond to their equity requirements (Acharya 
et al, 2011). 
The monitoring system of  the savings and loans imposed a loose regulatory framework and also 
had flimsy foundations. The operations of  examination and monitoring were absolutely separated 
from each other. As a consequence, no agent had the sole responsibility for the failure of  an 
institution (Moysich, 1997). The monitoring environment of  the institutions was not favorable at 
all in order to motivate the imposition of  corrective actions.  
Three are the main players that seem to have borne the overall responsibility for the situation 
created (Benston & Kaufman, 1990): 
1) The Federal Reserve Bank of  USA, which allowed an increase of  money supply during the 
1970s to levels that caused double-digit inflation that in turn led to higher nominal interest 
rates. Then, in 1979 the Federal Reserve Bank increased abruptly and unexpectedly interest 
rates aiming to reduce inflation directly. Thus, the market value of  the assets of  many savings 
and loans fell below the value of  their deposits and this fact rendered them insolvent. 
2) The elected officials (members of  the Congress and the Council), who ignored the fact that 
large and unexpected increases of  interest rates would cause great economic damage to the 
institutions which granted long-term fixed-rate loans and financed them with short-term 
deposits. They also ignored the fact that this danger would aggravate by the system of  
government insured deposits that existed. 
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3) The FHLBB which failed to warn the officials and the public about the hazards and the 
fragile nature of  a sector which financed long-term fixed-rate assets with short-term 
liabilities.  
From 1985 on, it became clear that the savings and loans faced significant problems. The 
insolvency of  many institutions became a frequent phenomenon which became far more intense 
during the period 1987-1988, when 1043 institutions with total assets over $500 billion failed 
(Curry & Shibut, 2000). The Insurance Agency for the savings and loans did not have sufficient 
funds to intervene and help. This led to the continuation of  the operations of  troubled 
institutions (zombie institutions) which had a further motive to engage in activities with high risk 
expecting equivalent high yields which would save them from the difficult situation in which they 
had fallen. All these resulted in the perpetuation of  the difficult situation in the savings and loan 
industry. 
The response of  the American government to the first signs of  fraud on the mid-1980s was 
controversial and contributed ultimately to the crisis. A close examination of  this response 
reveals that the savings and loan industry and its members were able to protect themselves by 
putting pressure on the key members of  Congress and other officials. However, explicit or 
implied, the cooperation between government officials and institution managers seems to have 
played a major role in preventing the legislative regulation and, thus, the crisis worsened (Calavita; 
Tillman & Pontell, 1997). 
The most important action of  the government in an attempt to deal with the crisis was the 
Financial Institution Recovery Reform and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989 (Brumbaugh & 
Litan, 1991). This Act referred almost exclusively to the savings and loan crisis and created the 
Resolution Trust Company whose aim was to close all the zombie institutions and to provide 
funds to pay off  their depositors. However, the negative net value of  a large and growing part of  
insolvent institutions could easily exceed the reserves of  this Corporation and FIRREA ignored 
to a great extent the economic factors in its attempt to confront the crisis. 
Whether FIRREA improved ultimately the regulation, control and supervision of  the savings and 
loans is not entirely clear. Any improvement, however, seemed to be meager. FIRREA ignored 
the division from 1986 onwards of  banks into healthy and not, the need for their differential 
treatment as well as the fact that due to specific accounting techniques that can conceal the 
weaknesses of  balance sheets the number of  insolvent banks was not easy to be identified.  
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The criticism that FIRREA accepted was that not only did it fail to confront the adverse 
condition of  the institutions, it even failed to understand the major issues of  the reform of  the 
deposit insurance and of  the regulation that this insurance required. The criticism of  FIRREA 
highlighted also its flaws regarding its approach to the reformation of  the Loan Regulation, of  
capital requirements, of  limitations on assets and of  their imposition. Generally, it was argued 
that the US government proved to be unprepared to deal with the savings and loan debacle. 
The savings and loan crisis was one of  the worst financial disasters of  the 20th century. Two 
aspects of  the damage to the savings and loans had generally consequences to the overall 
economy (Congress of  the United States, 1992). The first was the detrimental effect on the 
national capital stock as these institutions directed some of  the national investments towards 
ineffective and often worthless investment plans rather than productive and worthy. This 
reduction in national capital stock caused probably the Net National Product be lower than it 
would otherwise be. The other aspect stems from the fiscal policy implied by the deposit 
insurance system. 
The losses of  the savings and loans seem to have cost the nation a major amount of  income and 
production. Based on rough estimates, the deterioration of  all economic variables due to the 
crisis was far from insignificant. Heavy was also the blow for the taxpayers. The esteemed cost 
for the taxpayers, not including the interests over the government bonds that were sold in order 
to finance the rescue of  the industry, is about $150-$175 billion. If  interests are to be added this 
amount reaches the level of  $500 billion (Calavita; Pontell & Tillman, 1997).  
6. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE AND MISTAKES TO BE AVOIDED 
All forms of  crises through which an economy passes are costly, others to a greater others to a 
lesser extent. However, each one of  them can indicate errors and wrong ways of  handling and 
can teach us something for the future. 
According to Acharya et al (2011), two were the primary problems that were identified in the 
bank panic of  1907. The first of  them has to do with the fact that even private clearing houses 
faced the risk of  insolvency. The second concerns the trusts of  New York which were not 
allowed to be members of  the New York Clearing House because of  the intense competition 
between commercial banks and trusts.  
The lessons that the panic of  1907 can teach us are very important. First of  all, it became clear 
that a non-uniform and homogeneous banking system is very precarious and can lead to major 
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problems. Furthermore, information regarding the solvency or not of  financial institutions is 
very important, but its acquisition can be very difficult. What is more, there is need for an 
organization that can provide this kind of  information. The crisis highlighted the need for the 
existence and operation of  a lender of  last resort which would provide liquidity to solvent 
institutions that would be in need of  it. The provision of  liquidity by various private clearing 
houses proved to be ineffective. 
Tallman and Moen (1990) argue that the bank panic of  1907 has important policy lessons to 
teach us. The limitation in the types of  products on which national banks could invest did not 
reduce the riskiness of  the portfolios of  the financial system. The unequal treatment of  trusts 
and banks led to the concentration of  the most risky assets to a few institutions principally trusts. 
Negative progress of  trusts’ assets and specifically of  guaranteed loans increased the possibility 
of  insolvency. If  legislation provided institutions with equal access to all investment 
opportunities and all assets, the diversification of  their portfolios would reduce the risk the 
collapse of  a type of  assets to threaten the solvency of  a whole class of  institutions.  
Whether the access of  trusts to the clearing houses could have averted their insolvency given the 
high risk of  their portfolios cannot be guaranteed. Although the Clearing House of  New York 
operated to some extent as a central bank, the absence of  explicit legislative delegation prevented 
it from accomplishing entirely this function. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Clearing House kept information about the financial status of  
its members and so it could directly decide whether to provide or not a member with help 
whenever it was asked to intervene. The exclusion of  trusts from the Clearing House rendered 
the acquisition of  such kind of  information difficult for them and probably led to the isolation 
of  Knickerbocker. The unequal legislative reform was perhaps the heaviest blow of  all. Even 
with access to a lender of  last resort, under conditions of  unequal legal treatment, trusts would 
have no incentive to keep portfolios with profitable but risky assets. The possibility of  a whole 
type of  institutions to collapse would remain. 
About the Great Depression of  1929, Slivinsky (2008) mentions in a beautiful manner that 
perhaps the most major lesson that it has to teach us is that policy makers should obey to the 
Hippocratic Oath: “First do no harm”. And most times this means to avoid the temptation of  
getting involved and so violate the correction mechanisms of  the market itself. 
The lessons that the Great Depression has to teach us are the same disputable as its causes. 
Nowadays, the Central Banks operate as lenders of  last resort in order to provide liquidity to the 
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banking system and to boost economic growth. During the Great Depression, central banks 
refrained from that kind of  activities and it is uncertain to what extent such a strategy is 
appropriate as a way out of  the crisis. 
The key findings to which the analysis of  the Great Depression has led us are, according to 
Diebolt, Parent and Trabelsi (2010), three. First of  all, the response of  macroeconomic policy 
was the major factor that contributed to the severity and duration of  the Great Depression. 
Moreover, the lack of  proper measures of  expansionary monetary and fiscal policy by the Fed 
accelerated the Great Depression. Finally, the protectionism that characterized many countries 
during the 1930s magnified the recession to a great extent. 
The most important lessons we can derive from the crisis of  1929 have to do with the function 
of  the central bank and the financial system in general. The collapse of  the financial system may 
have been prevented if  the central bank had correctly understood its role as a lender of  last 
resort. Deflation played also a major role, while the gold standard applied at that period as a 
method of  supporting a fixed exchange rate system came to be disastrous as well. 
According to the European Commission (European Commission, 2009) five are the main lessons 
from the Great Crisis. First, it is important that public preserves its confidence in the banking 
system and that a collapse caused by credit reallocation should be prevented. Second, aggregate 
demand should be maintained and deflation should be avoided through various measures of  
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Third, it is important that the international trade be 
preserved and protectionism be avoided. Fourth, financial markets should remain open and have 
no capital restrictions. Finally, international cooperation should be cultivated and phenomena of  
nationalism be averted. 
The Savings and Loan Crisis in the 1980s was just as educative an event as the previous ones. It 
has been argued that this crisis could have been avoided if  timely measures were to be taken. The 
structure of  the industry was defective due to its sensitivity to interest rate risk, while non-
diversified portfolios of  long-term fixed interest rate assets which were financed by short-term 
liabilities proved to be a disastrous combination. The actions of  the state bodies not only proved 
to be ineffective, they even intensified the crisis. If  there is something we can learn from the 
crisis with certainty is that when the government provides a deposit insurance system, it should at 
the same time use apt accounting and strict supervision and control. Furthermore, the “too-big-
to-fail” common assumption cannot characterize any kind of  policy. There are many examples of  
large institution failures throughout history. 
 22 
The Savings and Loan Debacle, above all, demonstrated the importance of  capital as a shield 
which will ensure the requisite solvency and will protect the deposit guarantor. Moreover, it will 
discourage the saving units from taking on high risks, since they will hazard larger sums. The 
capital levels that these units maintain should be in proportion with the risks they undertake. The 
analysis of  the bankrupt units also shows the importance for the deposit insurance fund to have 
strong capitalization based on actual risk evaluation.  
The crisis demonstrated the need for immediate corrective measures that means the need for 
increase of  the restrictions over the activities of  the saving units once it gets clear that their funds 
drop significantly. Furthermore, the crisis showed the need for the existence of  a regulatory 
framework which will ensure the deposit guarantor and the need for existence of  adequate and 
appropriate examiners and auditors for the saving units. 
The importance of  the accounting practices in use is another issue that the Savings and Loan 
Debacle put forward, as they can distort the true image of  the units. The regulatory authorities 
can easily be deluded by the industry they regulate. Moral hazard is indeed a problem hard to 
avoid. It is very important that insured insolvent savings and loans be identified and shut down 
immediately in order to minimize potential losses for the insurance fund and ensure a more 
efficient financial market. The Savings and Loan debacle we could say, finally, demonstrated the 
need for application of  stress-tests to financial institutions and the need to monitor their 
structure, composition and size. 
7. RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, three major crises that occurred during the 20th century were examined, namely the 
Bank Panic of  1907, the Great Stock Crash of  1929 and the Great Depression that followed and 
the Savings and Loan Crisis of  the 1980s. All three crises started from the USA, their effects 
however were channeled globally. The bank panic of  1929 was the first major crisis of  the 20th 
century and was critical to the US economy, as it was followed by huge reforms in the banking 
system. 
The stock crash of  1929 and the subsequent depression were a black page in the global economic 
history. The period 1929-1933 was perhaps the most difficult period of  the entire century for the 
USA and many other countries. The Savings and Loan debacle was probably the most major 
postwar crisis in the US banking industry.  
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Economic crises have always happened and will continue to happen as everything shows. Every 
crisis is a special event and should be treated as such, as it takes place under discrete 
circumstances and is related to different causes and consequences. However, this does not mean 
that every crisis of  the past has nothing to teach us. Instead, each crisis can reveal wrong policies 
and mistakes which we should avoid in the future. 
The bank panic of  1907, in summary, revealed the need for a lender of  last resort and the need 
for a uniform and homogeneous regulation of  all bank institutions. It also demonstrated the 
importance of  information over the financial condition of  these institutions and the need for 
systematic control and supervision of  them. The crash and the depression of  1929 has taught us 
important lessons for the function of  the central bank and the financial system in general, as well 
as for the disastrous contribution of  the gold standard to the deterioration and contagion of  the 
crisis. It also demonstrated the importance of  maintaining the confidence of  investors and of  
keeping markets open to international trade. 
The Savings and Loan Crisis pointed the significance of  keeping sufficient capital and 
diversifying portfolios. It also pointed the need for existence of  an appropriate regulatory 
framework that will supervise the portfolios and the financial condition of  the savings and loans 
and will force them to keep capital levels commensurate with the risk levels they undertake. It, 
finally, rendered apparent the importance of  existence of  a deposit guarantor and specialized 
auditors and inspectors. 
The comprehension of  the past can be a powerful tool for the confrontation of  the future. 
Avoiding mistakes of  the past, this brought devastating consequences, lead economy forward and 
boosts economic growth. It is therefore very important that policy makers understand the 
mistakes of  the past, learn the lessons past has to teach them and with them in mind try to lead 
economy into growth and prosperity avoiding mistakes that have proven to be detrimental for the 
economy. 
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APPENDIX 
Group of  Tables 1. The course of  some basic economic measures during the crisis of  
1929 
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